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Food security twists and turns  
Why food systems need complex governance 
 
TIM LANG AND JOHN INGRAM 
 
 
<A> A note of caution about Mr Gladwell’s metaphor 
 
<FO> The language and theory of tipping points have become popular in academic, 
political and everyday discourse since Malcolm Gladwell’s book of the same name 
was published (Gladwell 2000). We are well aware of the arguments advanced 
around the association with metaphors in the introductory chapter to this book (1.1). 
But while metaphors and analogies are useful (and beloved of the human mind as 
well as culture) we believe some caution is necessary. Gladwell’s popular book is a 
pot-pourri of ideas, an intelligent journalist’s interpretation of insights from 
psychology, sociology and, above all, his reading of epidemiology. That he is a 
journalist is not a criticism. We offer it as a comment on how fissured modern 
academia and the sciences are. As is suggested by Giles Foden (3.1), Joe Smith 
(7.1), and Paul Brown (Commentary 7.3), it is often left to brilliant journalists and 
science writers to offer overviews or narratives that inform our lives and outlooks, 
especially where there is no solid evidentiary ground.  
Gladwell’s thesis is attractively simple. It filled a vacuum: how to interpret 
threats in a language that suits a political era infused (some say made) by the 
sound-bite. His concern is for change and whether there are points at which internal 
dynamics can go haywire. From epidemiology, for example, he takes the notion that 
we need to understand how diseases ‘tip’ from minorities to the masses. This is a 
deeply rooted and fearful notion, the age-old threat of contagion as superior force, 
and an unstoppable set of sequences and consequences, which can overwhelm 
human existence. The ‘tipping points’ metaphor thus can lead to deep pessimism, if 
not fatalism. History gives this some legitimacy, of course. There is a vast human 
experience of viruses, boiling points, catastrophe, and plagues. No wonder the 
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‘tipping points’ metaphor features so much in science fiction and sci-fi films. But 
Gladwell’s is a very American book in its inherent optimism. You can turn crisis into 
opportunity. You can make a difference. In this he is on a par with another popular 
metaphor now given credence in an era which favours light-touch government – 
‘nudge’ theory (Thaler and Sunstein 2008).  
Although we are wary of the consequences of politicians believing their 
favoured metaphors, this chapter is not a critique of Gladwell’s metaphor per se. 
Rather, it suggests that policymakers need more subtle analyses and metaphors if, 
in the case of food security, they are to begin to address the complexities of the real 
problems. Metaphors are useful if they help funnel activity in appropriate directions. 
They become dangerous if they encourage decision-makers to pursue single 
‘triggers’ or tension points. In food security, the best contemporary analyses suggest 
the need for multi-layered, systemic approaches to ensure availability and 
affordability of food. On a positive note, Gladwell himself has acknowledged that the 
real question is to ask what generates change, not the characteristics of tipping 
points. Our chapter tries to stay true to that wider task. Policy needs to be better 
informed by an understanding of the dynamics, drivers and challenges that shape or 
ought to shape food demand and supply ahead. The goal ought to be a world where 
societies are able to feed all people equitably, healthily, and in ways which enhance 
rather than destroy the habitability of the planet.  
 That is clearly not the case at present. There is a troubling but not unfamiliar 
gap between evidence and policy. And looking ahead, unless the vast majority of 
forecasting is wrong, humanity faces awesome challenges in this first half of the 
twenty-first century. It will have to adapt food systems to improve food resilience. 
Already, climate change is upon us; water stress too; and biodiversity loss (as 
Patricia Howard (4.2) and Toby Gardiner (4.3) cover in their companion chapters) 
endemic. The parameters of such environmental pressures have begun to be 
outlined by science and are impinging on the attention of policymakers. Less 
attention, however, is being given to the two other nodes of sustainable 
development’s triangle – society and economy – yet the social and economic 
implications of coming environmental change for food are considerable: threats of 
social dislocation, price volatility, and speculation. Over the last half-century, modes 
of consuming food have become normalized in the West which are unsustainable but 
profitable. The lock-in to unsustainability is tight. If food security is to be tackled, 
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innovative thinking which integrates environment, society and economy will be 
required from institutions and governance. This is currently not the case, and it is a 
failure not just of government, but of commerce and consumer culture. 
 
 
<A> Food security and food systems 
 
<FO> Like tipping points, ‘food security’ is a term with much baggage, used in many 
ways and with many different meanings (Maxwell 2001). Nonetheless a cluster of 
meanings dominates contemporary discourse (see examples in Table 4.1). In public 
policy, the notion of food security centres on the pursuit of a situation where 
everyone is fed or could be fed adequately, appropriately, affordably and regularly. 
The key issues are often described as three As: Availability, Access and 
Affordability. Analyses have tended to assume that insecurity stems from 
insufficiency of production or dislocation of supply. Yet from the 1970s, just as the 
term ‘food security’ came into policy discourse, the old awareness that hunger and 
insecurity can occur despite there being sufficient food on the planet to feed 
everyone had been reasserted by Drèze, Sen, and others (Drèze et al. 1999). Sen’s 
own argument stressed the role of entitlements as a key factor in famines. A 
deciding factor in whether famine takes hold is the social expression of rights and 
demand for food; it makes or breaks political demands to resolve or ride out harvest 
failure. Such analyses of food security stress the need for not just sustainable 
production, but for equitable distribution and sensitive culture change. Why is it that 












Table 4.1 Strands in the food security discourse  
 
Term Focus  Comment 
Food security The extent to which food 
systems can deliver adequate, 
affordable, accessible supplies, 
at many levels  
Currently this does not connect with the 
sustainability agenda. Security implies food 
systems which are ‘likely to continue or 
remain safe’ (OED). 
Food 
nationalism 
Policy priority to food from 
national resources and land  
May range from general desire for more 
self-sufficiency to autarky 
Food control Actions of state or other power 
sources to shape food systems 
Top-down control systems; rationing, at the 
most extreme 
Food defence Feeding in extreme 
emergencies 




Capacity to withstand and 
recover from shock  
Used widely in food security discourse with 
ecological roots but appeals elsewhere, e.g. 
insurance, military 
Food risks Factors which threaten food 
goals 
Appeals to systems thinking and suggests 
need to identify, rate and prevent risks 
Food 
entitlement 
Citizens’ sense of their rights to 
have access to adequate food 
Articulated by Nobel laureate Amartya Sen 
to explain why famines occur despite supply 
Food 
sovereignty 
Ensuring bottom-up societal 
control of primary production 
Championed by small farmer movements 
and development NGOs 
Food 
democracy 
Social engagement and 
pressure for food rights 
Emphasises political processes within 
societal demands for adequate food 
Food 
capacity 
Capabilities and requirements 
for any system of food 
production 
Environmental, economic and societal 




Building local food systems Mainly used in developed world to indicate 
locally led food provision. Tends to be used 
by organizations committed to sustainability 
frameworks. 
 





 In mainstream policy, the conventional definition of food security is that 
offered by the Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO). Morally based on the 
articulation of rights in the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and voiced 
loudly at the 1974 World Food Conference (FAO 1974), a definition of food security 
emerged which, by the 1996 World Food Summit, saw it as a state when: 
<EXT> 
all people, at all times, have physical and economic access to sufficient, safe, 
and nutritious food to meet their dietary needs and food preferences for an 
active and healthy life.  
(FAO 1996) 
</EXT> 
<FO> This definition suggests a broader notion than just the three As. But some key 
words, such as ‘food production’ and ‘agriculture’ – which might have been expected 
in such a definition – are not included. Most formal discussions of food security, 
therefore, recognize that it sits in a web of issues including food production, 
distribution, demand, rights, environment and health, all shaped by actors whose 
moral buy-in is assumed or expected. Yet this is not the case. Hunger remains on a 
mass scale today. And this approach to food security barely acknowledges that mal-
consumption and over-consumption might be factors in under-consumption. The 
discourse is pitched on welfarist terrain, with the developing world as supplicant or 
applicant and the developed world as donor (Lang et al. 2009).  
 The politics that this implies has a very long history. Arguably, the entire food 
security debate goes back centrally to Malthus’s Essay on the Principle of Population 
(Malthus 1798). Malthus, like Gladwell two centuries later, worried about irresolvable 
forces and trends; above all he feared population rising faster than the potential to 
increase food supply. His core question – and why his writing remains so potent 
today – was partly philosophical, partly political: can humans escape the limits of 
nature? (Malthus 1815).  
 Malthus was not one to shirk the politics of food security, which is why in part 
Karl Marx later in the nineteenth century was so exercised with finding flaws in his 
arguments. Societal structures, particularly land ownership and capital distribution, 
were downplayed, when the potential lay to unleash technology which could remove 
the barriers to hunger. Ossified social structures, not Malthusian inevitabilities create 
hunger, said Marx. 
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 In the mid-twentieth century, science and technical advance were posited as 
value-neutral means through which the Malthusian spectre could be banished. The 
Green Revolution’s plant breeding remains a prime example of that approach to food 
security; Norman Borlaug won the Peace Nobel Prize. By the end of the twentieth 
century, however, the social dimension of food (in)security was once more being 
reasserted. Even if technical change was needed, a social framework would be 
necessary to unlock its potential. A recent example of this more balanced approach 
was the World Bank’s and FAO’s evidence-based review published as the 
International Assessment of Agricultural Science and Technology Development 
Knowledge (IAASTD) (IAASTD 2008). This assessment proposed that social 
support, particularly to small-scale farming and to women in Africa, would help them 
achieve large increases in output and create economic pathways by which food 
demand could be met. Other recent large-scale reviews of the global food system 
conducted by national scientific teams in Australia, France and the UK have 
concurred with the case for a more balanced mix of technical, social and economic 
improvements to deliver food security (Foresight 2011; Paillard et al. 2011; PMSEIC 
(Australia) 2010). If this is the case, a framework of thinking based on systems 
analysis becomes almost inevitable. Food security has to blend multiple strands of 
issues – land, people, economics, social structures, environment, health, distribution 
– not reduce their complex interactions to one factor or favoured approach.  
 This is why policy discussion of food security inexorably dovetails into the 
challenge of wider sustainable development; indeed, food security is a microcosm of 
sustainable development. Equal attention to societal, economic and environmental 
drivers and outcomes is needed to ensure that food systems operate stably and 
adaptably.  
 The literature on food security amply justifies the necessity of such a systems 
analysis, pointing to critical stresses emerging for food supplies from: 
<B/L> 
• Environmental forces, such as climate change, water stress, soil, land use, 
biodiversity loss; 
• Economic forces, such as inappropriate price signals and uncosted 
externalities, fossil fuel reliance, labour force reorganization, urbanization, and 
first regionalization and now globalization; 
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• Social forces, such as population demand, the nutrition transition (changed 
eating patterns), diet-based ill-health patterns, the triumph of choice culture, 
the continuation of high levels of food waste. 
</B/L> 
<FO> The challenge ahead is not just producing enough but changing expectations 
that everyone can and should aspire to eat like the USA or UK. To eat like the former 
implies a society consuming as though there are five planets, and the latter a mere 
three planets (Global Footprint Network 2010). How did such an extraordinary state 
of affairs come about? 
 
 
<A> The world of food policy  
 
<FO> Throughout the twentieth century, while communist bloc politics were driving 
their experiments in one direction, the West was taking different routes. At the global 
level, food production kept ahead of rising population until relatively recently. 
Building on chemical, biological and transport advances, food production rose. 
‘Researchers turned policy advocates’ such as John Boyd Orr, the first Director 
General of FAO, charted a pathway past the opposing poles of Malthus and Marx. 
More food could be produced, by applying science, technology and capital, working 
with rather than imposing on primary producers. Knowledge could be dispersed, for 
example via extension services, rather than enforced through social control. Science 
could unleash potential everywhere. It could also help prevent waste from poor 
storage and inefficient distribution techniques. Thus food costs would come down, 
and availability would increase, delivering general welfare and preventing ill health 
(Boyd Orr 1943; Boyd Orr and Lubbock 1953). This had been a powerful and 
dominant analysis of food security for most of the twentieth century (Vernon 2007). 
Termed variously the ‘productivist’ or ‘productionist’ analysis, it emphasized 
underproduction as the policy problem to be resolved. The environment was to be 
reshaped, mined, and indeed tamed, to meet core human needs. With variations, it 
has been the paradigm for food policy for the last 70 years; food policy sought a 
planet tailored for people.  
8 
 
Part of the rationale for the paradigm’s adoption was the powerful evidence of 
hunger and mal-distribution of food in the West itself. Boyd Orr’s book, Food, Health 
and Income – a study of food poverty in the UK – was enormously influential 
throughout the British Empire (Boyd Orr 1936; Ostry 2006). The institutional 
architecture created in and after the Second World War owed its existence to such 
arguments. In the crisis of wartime, they began to plan for better structures to share 
knowledge and food, while avoiding draconian USSR-type intervention. The 
evidence of poor social distribution within the capitalist West – hunger in the USA 
and UK being particularly cited – reminded political decision-makers of how 
underconsumption and unaffordability were core problems, not just underproduction. 
Hence the visionary language of rights and possibilities in the 1943 Hot Springs 
Conference that spawned the FAO (Hot Springs Conference 1943), and the strand of 
‘Right to Food’ legalism from the 1948 UN Declaration to the 1974 World Food 
Conference, to the creation of the UN’s ‘Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food’ 
(Eide and Kracht 2005). 
 Recognition of the history of food security thinking clarifies why global and 
national institutions are as they are, and why they struggle to address food security 
as sustainability. They have adapted, of course, but they clearly struggle to face, let 
alone resolve, the complexity now emerging from multi-factorial analyses, such as 
from IAASTD and the Global Environmental Change and Food Security project 
(IAASTD 2008; Liverman and Kapadia 2010). Even in its decades of success, much 
of the pressure on the productionist paradigm came from mounting evidence about 
environmental damage and externalities. Evidence grew about the complexity of 
ecosystems’ infrastructure and about the impact of a runaway food culture based on 
untrammelled choice. Yet policy remained overwhelmingly productionist, with a 
welfarist safety net at global, but not always at national level (Shaw 2007).  
 In the twenty-first century, the world faces both old and new food dynamics. 
Today, for instance, hunger is again rising; after three decades of dropping as a 
proportion of world population, it is now back up to affecting a billion people. But this 
is outstripped by the 1.2 billion estimated to be overweight or obese (Gardner and 
Halweil 2000). Nowadays under-, over-, and mal-consumption of food co-exist. 
Loosened tastes and rampant consumerism have become major drivers of land use, 
as we see in the Amazon case study provided by Toby Gardner (4.3). Powerful 
global retailers and traders, not just national governments, dominate how food is 
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grown, distributed, priced and consumed (Burch and Lawrence 2007). The marketing 
budget of one giant soft-drinks corporation exceeds the World Health Organizations’ 
bi-annual public health budget (Lang et al. 2006). Billions of people today eat as only 
kings and the rich ate in the past; more people are clinically obese or overweight 
than are malnourished (Gardner and Halweil 2000). Entire new structures and 
networks of food commodity routes have been created, aided by the age of oil. 
Cheap oil has fuelled both the nutrition and logistics revolutions. Neither is 
sustainable. 
 At the start of the twenty-first century, therefore, public policy over food 
security is in some turmoil. On the one hand, there is widespread specialist 
recognition that a structural reassessment is in order. On the other hand, there is 
institutional and consumer lifestyle ‘lock-in’ to productionism’s inappropriate 
brilliance. This mismatch emerged clearly in 2006–08, when world political leaders 
began to realize something serious and new was facing the future of food and 
agriculture. In 2006, world agricultural commodity prices began to rise, and then 
rocketed in 2007–08 (see Figure 4.3). These peaked in 2008, but not before the FAO 
had won attention for the view that unless agriculture received more R&D investment 
and political support, the world would enter a neo-Malthusian crisis (FAO 2008). 
Neoliberal economists disagreed, arguing that price signals would reinvigorate 
production. As prices dropped and crop figures rose, it seemed they were right, only 
for the FAO Food Price Index to rise slowly again to the point where by 2011 they 
had exceeded 2008 peak levels. Oil prices, too, exceeded $125 a barrel. This added 
weight to the structural analyses urging fundamental review. Although the 
seriousness of the situation helped trigger many national inquiries and processes, 
such as former French President Sarkozy’s G20 inquiry into food price volatility, the 
fundamental ‘blank sheet’ rethink has not yet happened. Dominant thinking still 
centres on ‘produce more’ rather than ‘consume less or differently’, let alone radical 
redistributive politics.  
 The significance of this policy mess cannot be overestimated. There is much 
lock-in to the status quo. Who could not want to maintain a supermarket culture 
which offers 30,000 food items for the consumer to choose? But who takes seriously 
that, behind this astonishing feat, is an unsustainable reliance on oil? In the UK, for 
instance, one company sells a third of all food and drink consumed, one quarter of all 
lorries on UK roads are food-related, and half travel empty. Vast investment has 
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been expended on building the twentieth-century food infrastructure to enable this 
affront to sustainability. Yet policymakers continue to believe that somehow 
‘business as usual’ is both possible and desirable; they are either in a state of denial 
or else believe that market dynamics will resolve the difficulties.  
 Meanwhile evidence that addressing greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions alone 
requires huge change in rich countries’ food and lifestyles mounts (Audsley et al. 
2010). Future challenges go further than just GHGs, of course. A ‘one planet’ food 
system must develop new relationships with not just oil, but water, carbon, land, 
climate and ecosystems support. The transition to sustainability and long-term food 
security will be rocky and requires culture change, not just a few products with ‘lo 
carbon’ or ‘bird friendly’ labels.  
UK governments since the 1970s have championed liberal food policy 
analyses despite (sometimes because of) membership of the Common Agricultural 
Policy (HM Treasury and Defra 2005). Today, with home food production back down 
to 1950s proportions (after a high point in the 1980s) UK governments are acutely 
aware of their reliance on external sources, on how sterling levels shape food prices, 
and how reliance on big food retailers to lower food prices has its limits (Collingham 
2011). Investment in sustainable food systems is a priority, yet consumers and 
retailers themselves are hooked on the pursuit of ‘cheap food’ rather than 
sustainable food. This tension began to surface in the UK, and across OECD 
economies more generally, when world agricultural commodity prices rocketed in the 
2007–08 price spike.  
 Concerned, the UK set up a Cabinet Office review. The resulting Food 
Matters report in 2008 proposed a more integrated analysis and policy (Cabinet 
Office 2008). It suggested a new ‘low carbon and healthy’ framework for the UK and 
de facto EU food system. This new perspective suggested that equal emphasis 
needs to be given to supply and consumption; to push and pull; to society, 
environment and production, not just production; to the interface of people, natural 
systems and socio-economic structures. It called for processes and institutions to 
manage change, and the need to acknowledge not just technical but socio-political 
options; to incorporate not just economic but cultural factors; to address not just 
farming but ever longer supply chains. The discourse thus began to move from 
mapping problems and their extent to what to do about it, and to scoping policy re-
engagement with the world of investment, and better coordination between state, 
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companies and consumerism. In short, what began to emerge from just one high 
level review of one relatively small country was a case for renewed integrated public 
policy, not just narrow ‘market-think’. ‘Leave it to Tesco et al.’ is not a sustainable nor 
sensible public policy, not least since big retailers and processors are only too aware 
of how coming crises might destabilize their own supply chains and market value – 
hence their creation of some interesting parallel processes such as the Sustainable 
Agriculture Initiative and GlobalGAP (GlobalGAP 2008; SAI 2008). These are 
company-specific rather than planetary global initiatives, but they are signs that even 
the powerful are nervous. Certainly, the undertow is that not just academics and 
analysts are voicing the question as to whether public food governance and 
institutions are ‘fit for purpose’. 
 It is important not to lose sight of the enormous successes of twentieth-
century agriculture. The impact of 150 years of research and field experimentation 
has delivered major advances in food production, most notably in food crops (and 
especially in the ‘green revolution’ in the 1960s and 1970s). There have also been 
significant advances in animal sciences and in understanding fisheries. Globally, 
however, although food production has kept ahead of global demand, there are still 
marked regional differences in food security. And the fragility of the current global 
food system was illustrated by the immediate consequences of the 2008 price rises.  
 This is important in the context of tipping points. The 2006–08 food price spike 
propelled the broader notion of food security into the policy and public eye. Almost 
overnight, governments were issuing statements about food security (as opposed to 
food production) and the media were relaying these to civil society. A key 
consideration for the tipping points discussion is that many reasons were advanced 
for the ‘food crisis’ including not only poor harvests due to weather anomalies but 
also commodity price speculation, increased demand for grains, export bans on 
selected foodstuffs, inadequate grain stocks, higher oil prices and the use of crop 
lands for the production of biofuels (Gregrory and Ingram 2008).  
 The world of food policy now has to address a wide range of drivers. These 
are highly complex. While climate change could well accentuate the interaction of 
factors shaping access, affordability, and utilisation, it is but one of several external 
stressors acting on the food system. Economic access to food, and hence 
livelihoods, is critically important. If policymakers are to consider future change 
successfully and based on evidence, they require understanding of the whole food 
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system rather than just the production component. In this context we share the 
argument, advanced in Chapter 1.1, that tipping points could be better understood as 
combinations of intertwining factors. 
 
 
<A> Food systems, food security and food vulnerabilities 
 
<FO> The Global Environmental Change and Food Security (GECAFS) project is an 
example of a major research effort in the 2000s which ideally ought to have been 
central to this process of building integrated policy understanding. For GECAFS, 
Ericksen (2008) conceptually divided food security into three major components, 
each of which needs to be stable over time: food availability (which depends on food 
production, distribution and exchange), food access (which depends on food 
affordability, allocation and preference), and food utilization (which depends on 
nutritional value, social value, and food safety) (Ericksen 2008). These components 
are all outcomes of a number of activities of the ‘food chain’: (1) producing food; (2) 
processing food and packaging food; (3) distributing and retailing food; and (4) 
consuming food. Both the food systems activities and the consequences of these 
activities for food security (i.e. their outcomes), are influenced by global 
environmental change; and the activities have environmental feedbacks as well as 
food security implications.  
 These activities lead to a number of outcomes, many of which contribute to 
food security, and others which relate to environmental and other social welfare 
concern. The GECAFS food-system model attempted to capture this dynamic. 
Ingram (2011) details five contrasting examples where its application has helped 
focus research and policy formulation. Food security is compromised as and when 
any of the components of food security is diminished, as is usually the case when 
food-system activities are disrupted by any stress. While each activity is to some 
extent vulnerable to global environmental change, it is the combined vulnerability of 
the food system as a whole, which is critically important for food security. This is 
what the Royal Institute for International Affairs (Chatham House) called the ‘new 
fundamentals’ for food policy (Ambler-Edwards et al. 2009). The massive floods in 
Pakistan in 2010 affected the whole food system: storing food, distributing food, 
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retailing and consuming food as well as severely disrupting production itself. Single 
issues affect all food system activities, but are influenced by cultural and social 
capacities for accommodation and adjustment, as covered by Emily Boyd (7.2). 
 So what are the likely pressures for change in food systems which might lead 
to increased food insecurity? While climate change will undoubtedly be a major 
factor impacting food production in many regions, it is the combination of increasing 
demand for food, coupled with growing climate stress (combined with yet further 
environmental stresses such as reduced water availability or soil degradation), that 
will be critical. While producing food has kept ahead of food demand historically, 
global demand is now growing fast. Economic growth in countries such as China and 
India, coupled with urbanization and the increasing influence of the retailing sector, is 
pushing up the consumption of meat and dairy products, projected to increase by up 
to 2.4 per cent annually between 2007 and 2016 (Von Braun, 2007). Goodland and 
Anhang (2009) suggest that the total contribution to global GHG emission could be 
as high as 51 per cent. This kind of analysis contributes to the lively debate for one 
meatless day per week. 
 Diets don’t ‘Westernize’ by themselves. Very aggressive campaigns on the 
part of major corporations and Western governments to shift diets to Western 
patterns in poorer economies continue to have a very substantial impact, as have 
Western subsidies and ‘dumping’ of products – e.g. milk powder from the EU into 
China. Different policy discourses emerge from this picture. On the one hand some 
argue that this is progress; why shouldn’t the Chinese or Indians eat more and 
differently? On the other hand, evidence from Western countries already suggests 
costly healthcare consequences from the nutrition transition. How can Mumbai afford 
its rocketing type 2 diabetes rate? Or China its rise of non-communicable disease as 
it consumes more fat? (Chen et al. 1991). Even the West has political difficulties with 
the health aspects of its unsustainable food footprint. One European Commission 
study, for instance, estimated that food accounts for 30 per cent of European 
consumers’ environmental impact (Tukker et al. 2006). A study of UK food GHG 
emissions also estimated that food accounts for 30 per cent (Audsley et al. 2010). If 
GHGs are to be reduced, considerable changes in Western food consumption 
patterns will be crucial. 
 This is what troubles politicians. In developing countries, the rising middle 
classes would love to be able to eat like their counterparts in the West. In the 
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developed world, companies and politicians are both nervous of weaning consumers 
off that lifestyle. Yet already policy decisions are being made which add further 
pressures to the already unsustainable mix. Commitments to increase and subsidise 
biofuel production are a case in point. On the supply side, the diversion of a 
significant proportion of the US maize crop to bio-ethanol production (25 per cent of 
the crop in 2007), coupled with poor harvests of wheat in Australia and parts of 
eastern Europe, reduced the amount of long-distance tradable grains at a time when 
global cereal stocks (about 400 million tonnes) were at their lowest levels since the 
early 1980s (Gregrory and Ingram 2008). Maize exports from the USA averaged 47 
million tonnes per year from 2000 to 2005, but in 2007 80 million tonnes went to 
ethanol refineries. Oil prices have also risen leading to increased fertilizer, transport 
and distribution coats, and a growing realization that world cereal and energy prices 
are not independent (Von Braun 2007). This was realized in the early 1970s but was 
politically marginalized, ironically due to the success of the Green Revolution and the 
new political compact between the oil-rich Middle East and dependent OECD 
Western states (Green 1978). The linkage is clearly seen in wheat prices, which like 
oil tripled between January 2000 and July 2007, and in the doubling of maize and 
rice prices over the same period (Von Braun 2007). 
 The OECD and FAO have now acknowledged that the era of dropping 
agricultural commodity prices may well be over. While average food prices have 
declined, food prices for many of the poor have not dropped over time as a 
percentage of their disposable income. This may be good news for urbanized 
consumers and food processors, but troubling for primary producers (OECD and 
FAO 2008). Their joint Agricultural Outlook report predicts price rises in the 2010s. 
The lack of stocks may be a major factor in the short-term increase in grain prices, 
but while the current high prices are unlikely to be sustained as farmers increase 
production in 2008, they are likely to remain relatively high for the medium term. This 
will bring benefits to some producers but it poses problems for the poor, 
governments of low income countries, and aid agencies supplying food, although 
with the appropriate policies higher prices could provide incentives to produce local 
food and stimulate agriculture.  
 But how will the additional impacts of climate change, and its likely growing 
importance in the future as a factor affecting food systems, further complicate what is 
already a very complex situation? Gregory and Ingram (2008) reviewed the present 
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knowledge of recorded impacts of climate change and variability on crop production, 
and estimated its contribution to the then current ‘food crisis’ (Gregrory and Ingram 
2008). Such contributions might arise directly through the impact of existing climate 
change and/or climate variability on crop production, or arise indirectly through 
actions to mitigate or adapt to anticipated changes in climate. As they point out, the 
effect of increasing the mean temperature is relatively straightforward with the 
frequency distribution moved towards hotter and away from colder temperatures. 
However, increased variability of temperature becomes very important if crop 
biological responses are non-linear, and there are absolute thresholds for crop 
resilience.  
 Increasing variability of weather (and thus climate) may stem from three 
sources: 
<B/L> 
• Changes in the mean weather, such as an increase in annual mean 
temperature and/or precipitation; 
• A change in the distribution of weather so that there are more frequent 
extreme weather events such as physiologically damaging temperatures or 
longer periods of drought; 
• A combination of changes to the mean and its variability. 
</B/L> 
The consequences of the dry conditions on grain production and exports have 
been significant. Recent volatility in wheat prices has shown the impact of drought 
and seasonal fluctuation and has been a reminder that small variations in Australia, 
for example, can throw price predictions, open up opportunities for speculation and 
compound the effects of US and EU decisions to build biofuel production (Gregrory 
and Ingram 2008). 
 
 
<A> Environmental interactions with food systems 
 
<FO> There is now a substantial body of work that shows how sensitive agricultural 
production is to climate change, water and energy inputs (e.g. IPCC 2007, Stern 
2008). Agricultural systems could be thrown by weather extremes, such as a drought 
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season (or successive droughts), thereby accelerating migration and urbanization 
which in turn stresses food distribution and labour markets.  
 While the impacts of environmental change on food production might be the 
most obvious issue, other food system activities are vulnerable to such stress. Food 
transport is one determinant of food availability; most people do not grow their own 
food and they rely on distribution systems to bring food to them. The world has now 
passed the point where a majority is urbanized. At a local level, food distribution 
might be stressed if a critical piece of distribution infrastructure (e.g. a railway or road 
bridge) is destroyed by a flood. In many cases a ‘work around’ can reduce its impact 
(by finding another route for example) but not always. Emily Boyd (7.2) takes this 
further, but relevant here are aspects of community response.  
 Concentrating on the vulnerability of distinct-level food systems to global 
environmental change in the Indo-Gangetic Plain, a GECAFS food-systems 
approach identified that the ‘vulnerability points’ were due to a number of interacting 
socio-economic and bio-geophysical factors; the context is fundamentally important 
(Aggarwal et al. 2004). In Ludhiana District of the Indian Punjab, for instance, where 
socio-economic development has led to a dependence on irrigation, the key 
vulnerability point is reduced irrigation supply due to lowering groundwater tables 
due to excessive extraction. This threatens crop productivity and overall production. 
In contrast, in the Ruhani Basin District, in the Nepali Terai, food security depends 
on moving food from village to village, especially in times of stress. Increased 
flooding due to glacier melt, coupled with more extreme weather, disrupts footpaths, 
bridges, and other vital food distribution infrastructure. Taking a food-system 
approach helped identify the vulnerability points in two contrasting Districts in the 
Indian Punjab and the Nepali Terai and showed them to be quite different. They will 
need very different adaptation responses to reduce their respective vulnerabilities: 
agronomic in the Indian case, structural and policy in the Nepali case. 
 Climate change and other aspects of environmental change stress food 
systems in a number of ways which may lead to organized responses of the kinds 
described by Emily Boyd. But food-system activities feed back to environmental 
conditions, which may in turn exacerbate these stresses. From a food perspective, 
agriculture is usually thought of as the main culprit. 12–14 per cent of total GHG 
emissions are attributed to agriculture, and a further 18 per cent attributed to land 
use change and forestry, much of which relates to clearing land for agriculture and 
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pasture (Foresight 2011). While agriculture and associated activities clearly 
contribute substantially to GHG emissions and other aspects of environmental 
degradation, all food-system activities lead to GHG emissions. Edwards and 
colleagues estimated that in the US food system 40 per cent of emissions are due to 
non-agricultural food-system activities (Edwards et al. 2009). But GHG emission is 
not the only environmental consequence of food systems. Impacts on biodiversity, 
on biogeochemical cycles, on fresh water resources, and on other environmental 
parameters are all in part caused by food-system activities. 
 An initial analysis by Ingram (2011) uses a matrix to indicate where the four 
sets of food-system activities contribute to crossing a number of ‘planetary 
boundaries’ (as identified by Rockstrom et al. 2009; see Table 4.2). Far from 
reducing the impacts attributed to agriculture, Table 4.2 provides examples in almost 
all cells of the matrix. Clearly mitigation opportunities exist across the food system. 
But it is also well worth noting that much of the GHG emission could be reduced 
across the whole food system if less food was wasted by consumers (Foresight 
2011). Parfitt and colleagues report that 25 per cent of food purchased (by weight) is 
wasted in UK households, and that the 8.3 million tonnes of food and drink wasted 
each year in the UK has a carbon impact exceeding 20 million tonnes of CO2-
equivalent (Parfitt et al. 2010). Reducing food waste by only 25 per cent in the USA 





Table 4.2 Examples of how food-chain activities (columns) affect key environmental 
variables (rows) 
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<A> The institutional challenge 
 
<FO> The picture of food security sketched here is one whose complexity and global 
reach poses significant challenges for governance. In the mid-twentieth century, after 
the Second World War, governments were the drivers of reformed food policies 
designed principally to raise production. But, in the twenty-first century, power and 
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influence lie in a new global configuration of vast companies alongside altered 
national governmental powers, along with consumer and environmental groups. This 
ill-coordinated patchwork of multilevel governance – part public, part private, part 
global, part national – has to address global to local capacities in order to feed an 
unprecedented combination of 9 billion people in 2050, in an era of climate change 
with changed economies, societal expectations and consumer cultures. Figure 4.10 
provides a conceptual model of current food systems. This conceives of food flowing 
down a supply chain, drawing upon natural, social and economic capital, with 
outputs and consequences which feed back on the system dynamics. Around this 
central flow, other forces operate. Multiple stresses and interactions are possible, 
whose direction is affected by institutions and governance.  
 The mid-twentieth century policy model was more top-down than it is today, 
with government broadly shaping the relationship between supply-chain actors, 
consumers and civil society. That model has been frayed by new dynamics: 
regionalization and globalization, consumerism and the astonishing expansion of 
choice culture, and the spread and flow of information and other technologies. The 
result is that the activities of farmers and growers is largely dictated away from the 
land, even in the developing world, let alone in Western societies where more people 
are employed off than on the land. Farming and food production remain hugely 
important for food security, of course, not least because they are the largest 
employers on the planet, engaging nearly 400 million people.  
 It is primarily governments which have the legitimacy and policy potential to 
facilitate any transition to sustainable food systems for food security. Are 
governments able to do this? Attempts to create new policy frameworks, even in the 
area of trade (which governments almost universally state through the World Trade 
Organization is their top priority), have not successfully engaged with the challenge 
of sustainability. Trade rules have been framed around the pursuit of commerce 
rather than living within environmental limits. Yet, as we noted above, along with 
Amanda Long (Commentary 6.4), some giant commercial companies now realize the 
urgency of sustainability, if only as threats to their brands and their own survival. The 
assumption is often made that food governance will inevitably be delivered by 
existing institutions, as though they are (a) functioning adequately, (b) have 
appropriate terms of reference, and (c) have a good understanding of how best to 
integrate environmental, social and economic policy demands for food systems.  
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 These assumptions do not hold. And there are good reasons for why modern 
food governance is fraying. First, there are tensions over priorities – trade, 
environment, health, and consumers. Secondly, governance is inexorably multilevel, 
with competing pulls from local, sub-national, national, regional and global levels of 
democratic accountability. And thirdly, institutional complexity has been compounded 
by failure to restructure. At the UN level alone there is fragmentation among the big 
organizations. The FAO dwarfs the World Health Organization. Environmental issues 
are championed by the UN Environment Programme (UNEP), but are largely 
sidelined by the sole body which is supposed to arch across the UN, the old 
Administrative Committee on Co-ordination/Sub-Committee on Nutrition (ACC/SCN), 
now renamed the ‘Standing Committee on Nutrition’.  
 No one champions an integrated approach to food policy per se. Food 
security de facto receives most policy attention from the World Food Programme, 
which has an overt crisis-mitigation role, but which is entirely dependent on donor 
beneficence. A welfarist backstop or safety net is essential, but prevention rather 
than crisis management is what is now required. In government, like commerce, 
institutional divisions are inevitable. What matters is cross-sectoral or ministerial 
coordination. And it is here that failures of governance have been most marked. 
 Happily, pressures to reform world food security governance have begun to 
emerge. In the UN, a Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food was created in the 
late 1990s. This office has become a remarkable voice for reformed governance 
through a series of powerful papers addressed to the Secretary General 
(www.srfood.org). In 2010, the Committee on World Food Security, created in 1974, 
was revamped and given new urgency. It remains to be seen whether the renewed 
body will get a grip of the new policy requirements, and drive action on prevention 
and the delivery of sustainable food systems.  
 Our recommendation is that more thought needs to be given to how global, 
regional, national, and local policy architecture could help the transition to 
sustainable food systems. Better coordination, thinking capacity and sharing of 
experimentation are clearly required. But where is the political will? For this to 
happen, policymakers need to give equal emphasis to all aspects of sustainability. 
History suggests that food shocks are not always anticipated. As Emily Boyd (7.2) 
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